Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then q’ (...) is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S to accept p and consider q, S would accept q. Now consider an indicative conditional of the form (1) If p, then I believe p. Suppose that you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’. To accept p while rejecting ‘I believe p’ is tantamount to accepting the Moore-paradoxical sentence ‘p and I do not believe p’, and so is irrational. To accept p while suspending judgment about ‘I believe p’ is irrational for similar reasons. So rationality requires that if you accept p and consider ‘I believe p’, you accept ‘I believe p’. (shrink)

IΣ n andBΣ n are well known fragments of first-order arithmetic with induction and collection forΣ n formulas respectively;IΣ n 0 andBΣ n 0 are their second-order counterparts. RCA0 is the well known fragment of second-order arithmetic with recursive comprehension;WKL 0 isRCA 0 plus weak König's lemma. We first strengthen Harrington's conservation result by showing thatWKL 0 +BΣ n 0 is Π 1 1 -conservative overRCA 0 +BΣ n 0 . Then we develop some model theory inWKL 0 and illustrate (...) the use of formalized model theory by giving a relatively simple proof of the fact thatIΣ 1 provesBΣ n+1 to be Π n+2-conservative overIΣ n . Finally, we present a proof-theoretic proof of the stronger fact that theΠ n+2 conservation result is provable already inIΔ 0 + superexp. ThusIΣ n+1 proves 1-Con (BΣ n+1) andIΔ 0 +superexp proves Con (IΣ n )↔Con(BΣ n+1). (shrink)

The rational price of the Pasadena and Altadena games, introduced by Nover and Hájek (2004 ), has been the subject of considerable discussion. Easwaran (2008 ) has suggested that weak expectations — the value to which the average payoffs converge in probability — can give the rational price of such games. We argue against the normative force of weak expectations in the standard framework. Furthermore, we propose to replace this framework by a bounded utility perspective: this shift renders the problem (...) more realistic and accounts for the role of weak expectations. In particular, we demonstrate that in a bounded utility framework, all agents, even if they have different value functions and disagree on the price of an individual game, will finally agree on the rational price of a repeated, averaged game. Thus, we explain the intuitive appeal of weak expectations, while avoiding both trivialization of the original paradox and the drawbacks of previous approaches. (shrink)

Bryne & Hajek (1997) argue that Lewis’s (1988; 1996) objections to identifying desire with belief do not go through if our notion of desire is ‘causalized’ (characterized by causal, rather than evidential, decision theory). I argue that versions of the argument go through on certain assumptions about the formulation of decision theory. There is one version of causal decision theory where the original arguments cannot be formulated—the ‘imaging’ formulation that Joyce (1999) advocates. But I argue this formulation is independently (...) objectionable. If we want to maintain the desire as belief thesis, there’s no shortcut through causalization. (shrink)

An effect algebra is a partial algebraic structure, originally formulated as an algebraic base for unsharp quantum measurements. In this article we present an approach to the study of lattice effect algebras (LEAs) that emphasizes their structure as algebraic models for the semantics of (possibly) non-standard symbolic logics. This is accomplished by focusing on the interplay among conjunction, implication, and negation connectives on LEAs, where the conjunction and implication connectives are related by a residuation law. Special cases of LEAs are (...) MV-algebras and orthomodular lattices. The main result of the paper is a characterization of LEAs in terms of so-called Sasaki algebras. Also, we compare and contrast LEAs, Hájek's BL-algebras, and the basic algebras of Chajda, Halaš, and Kühr. (shrink)

Studie recenzuje díla: Richard DAWKINS, Boží blud: Přináší náboženství útěchu, nebo bolest? Praha: Academia 2009, 480 s. ; HANUŠ, J. - VYBÍRAL, J., Dawkins pod mikroskopem: Diskuse nad knihou Richarda Dawkinse Boží blud. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury 2010. Cílem textu je poukázat na debatu vyvolanou českým vydáním Dawkinsova díla Boží blud, jejímž nejdůkladnějším příspěvkem je vydání knihy Dawkins pod mikroskopem.

In Hájek et al. (J Symb Logic 65(2):669–682, 2000) the authors introduce the concept of supersound logic, proving that first-order Gödel logic enjoys this property, whilst first-order Łukasiewicz and product logics do not; in Hájek and Shepherdson (Ann Pure Appl Logic 109(1–2):65–69, 2001) this result is improved showing that, among the logics given by continuous t-norms, Gödel logic is the only one that is supersound. In this paper we will generalize the previous results. Two conditions will be presented: the first (...) one implies the supersoundness and the second one non-supersoundness. To develop these results we will use, between the other machineries, the techniques of completions of MTL-chains developed in Labuschagne and van Alten (Proceedings of the ninth international conference on intelligent technologies, 2008) and van Alten (2009). We list some of the main results. The first-order versions of MTL, SMTL, IMTL, WNM, NM, RDP are supersound; the first-order version of an axiomatic extension of BL is supersound if and only it is n-potent (i.e. it proves the formula ${\varphi^{n}\,\to\,\varphi^{n\,{+}\,1}}$ for some ${n\,\in\,\mathbb{N}^+}$ ). Concerning the negative results, we have that the first-order versions of ΠMTL, WCMTL and of each non-n-potent axiomatic extension of BL are not supersound. (shrink)

Our work is a contribution to the model theory of fuzzy predicate logics. In this paper we characterize elementary equivalence between models of fuzzy predicate logic using elementary mappings. Refining the method of diagrams we give a solution to an open problem of Hájek and Cintula (J Symb Log 71(3):863–880, 2006, Conjectures 1 and 2). We investigate also the properties of elementary extensions in witnessed and quasi-witnessed theories, generalizing some results of Section 7 of Hájek and Cintula (J Symb Log (...) 71(3):863–880, 2006) and of Section 4 of Cerami and Esteva (Arch Math Log 50(5/6):625–641, 2011) to non-exhaustive models. (shrink)

The volume includes the proceedings from the conference FOL75 -- 75 Years of First-Order Logic held at Humboldt University, Berlin, September 18 - 21, 2003 on the occasion of the anniversary of the publication of Hilbert's and Ackermann's Grundzuge der theoretischen Logik. The papers provide analyses of the historical conditions of the shaping of FOL, discuss several modern rivals to it, and show the importance of FOL for interdisciplinary research. While there is no doubt that the celebrated book marks a (...) most important step in the development of logic, the volume in hand proves the actuality of the question "Which logic is the right logic." The volume contains articles by: H. Andreka, J. X. Madarasz, I. Nemeti, A. Avron, K. Brunnler, A. Guglielmi, G. Englebretsen, W. Ewald, P. Hajek, J. Hintikka, W. Hodges, M. Kracht, R. Lanzet, H. Ben-Yami, C. Toke, S. P. Odintsov, H. Wansing, J. A. Robinson, M. Rossberg, M. Thielscher, D. E. Willard, andJ. Wole 'nski. (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions: What is the role of consciousness in the creative process? How does the audience for a work for art influence its creation? How can creativity emerge through childhood pretending? Do great works of literature give us insight into human nature? Can a computer program really be (...) creative? How do we define creativity in the first place? Is it a virtue? What is the difference between creativity in science and art? Can creativity be taught? The new essays that comprise The Philosophy of Creativity take up these and other key questions and, in doing so, illustrate the value of interdisciplinary exchange. Written by leading philosophers and psychologists involved in studying creativity, the essays integrate philosophical insights with empirical research. CONTENTS I. Introduction Introducing The Philosophy of Creativity Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman II. The Concept of Creativity 1. An Experiential Account of Creativity Bence Nanay III. Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art 2. Creativity and Insight Gregory Currie 3. The Creative Audience: Some Ways in which Readers, Viewers and/or Listeners Use their Imaginations to Engage Fictional Artworks Noël Carroll 4. The Products of Musical Creativity Christopher Peacocke IV. Ethics & Value Theory 5. Performing Oneself Owen Flanagan 6. Creativity as a Virtue of Character Matthew Kieran V. Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science 7. Creativity and Not So Dumb Luck Simon Blackburn 8. The Role of Imagination in Creativity Dustin Stokes 9. Creativity, Consciousness, and Free Will: Evidence from Psychology Experiments Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and C. Nathan DeWall 10. The Origins of Creativity Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers 11. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: a Contradiction in Terms? Margaret Boden VI. Philosophy of Science 12. Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Dean Keith Simonton VII. Philosophy of Education (& Education of Philosophy) 13. Educating for Creativity Berys Gaut 14. Philosophical Heuristics Alan Hájek. (shrink)

Where does consciousness come from and how does it work? Is it a purely biological thing? Where does the brain leave off and the mind begin? These questions, once viewed as ethereal and impossible to study empirically, are now being addressed by science in bold and startling new ways.In Consciousness, world-renowned neuropsychiatrist J. Allan Hobson presents a witty and introspective consideration of this mysterious concept, connecting it to specific areas of the brain and their chemical and physical states. Hobson guides (...) his readers through the various states of waking, dreaming, and nonconsciousness using the theories and data of neuroscience, psychiatry, and neurophysiology. Although his ideas are based in science, his imaginative approach keeps us in touch with the mysterious and seductive nature of his subject.Richly woven, with references to literature, philosophy, and the author's personal experiences, Consciousness is a delightful and compact introduction to a concept central to the human experience. (shrink)

In the standard and traditional view, the concept of conditional probability is defined with what is known as the ratio formula: the probability of B given A is the ratio between the probability of A and B and the probability of A. It is well known that this definition does not match the conceptual and mathematical expectations that we have from conditional probability, especially for the probability values at the limits. Thus, as pointed out by several philosophers such as Popper (...) and Hájek, it is fair to conclude that we have yet to have a satisfactory definition for the concept of conditional probability. E.J. Lowe, in a debate with Dorothy Edgington, proposed two different definitions of conditional probability, and unfortunately his definitions have gone unnoticed in the literature. In this paper, my main aim is to renew interest in Lowe’s definitions. I achieve this aim by showing that E.J. Lowe’s definitions have great potential in providing us with a satisfactory definition of conditional probability.Standard Olasılık kuramında bir olayın bir diğer olaya koşullu olasılığı rasyo formülü olarak bilinen bir formül ile tanımlanmaktadır. Bu formüle göre B olayının A olayına koşullu olasılığı olayının olasığının sadece A olayının olasılığına bölünmesi ile bulunan değerdir. Bu standard tanımın özellikle limitlerdeki olasılık değerleri için kavramsal ve matematiksel beklentilerimizi karşılamadığı bilinen bir durumdur. Aralarında Popper ve Hájek gibi isimlerin de bulunduğu birçok felsefecinin de belirttiği gibi, bu durumdan elimizde tatmin edici bir koşullu olasılık tanımı olmadığını çıkarsamak yanlış olmayacaktır. E.J. Lowe, Dorothy Edgington ile girdiği bir tartışma bağlamında koşullu olasılığın iki alternatif tanımını önermiştir. Ne yazık ki, literatürde bu tanımlara gereken önem verilmemiştir. Literatürdeki bu eksikliği gidermeyi hedefleyen bu makalenin genel amacı, Lowe’ün önerilerinin tatmin edici bir koşullu olasılık tanımı sunma potansiyeline sahip olduğunu göstermektir. (shrink)

We would like to thank Dolega and Dewhurst for a thought-provoking and informed deconstruction of our article, which we take as applause from valued members of our audience. In brief, we fully concur with the theatre-free formulation offered by Dolega and Dewhurst and take the opportunity to explain why we used the Cartesian theatre metaphor. We do this by drawing an analogy between consciousness and evolution. This analogy is used to emphasize the circular causality inherent in the free energy principle. (...) We conclude with a comment on the special forms of active inference that may be associated with selfawareness and how they may be especially informed by dream states. (shrink)

Prominent philosophers have argued that contradictions contain either too much or too little information to be useful. We dispute this with what we call the “Paradox of the Two Firefighters.” Suppose you are awakened in your hotel room by a fire alarm. You open the door. You see three possible ways out: left, right, straight ahead. You see two firefighters. One says there is exactly one safe route and it is to your left. The other says there is exactly one (...) safe route and it is to your right. While the two firemen are giving you contradictory information, they are also both giving you the perhaps useful information that there is a safe way out and it is not straight ahead. We give two analyses. The first uses the “Opinion Tetrahedron,” introduced by Dunn as a generalization of Audun Jøsang’s “Opinion Triangle.” The Opinion Tetrahedron in effect embeds the values of the “Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic” into a context of subjective probability generalized to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and two kinds of uncertainty—that in which the reasoner has too little information and that in which the reasoner has too much information. Jøsang had only a single value for uncertainty. We also present an alternative solution, again based on subjective probability but of a more standard type. This solution builds upon “linear opinion pooling.” Kiefer had already developed apparatus for assessing risk using expert opinion, and this influences the second solution. Finally, we discuss how these solutions might apply to “Big Data” and the World Wide Web. (shrink)

An important role of the philosopher is to critically reflect on what is often taken for granted, using the tools of argument and analysis. This article engages with six different papers that offer critical reflections on conventional concepts and beliefs in bioethics regarding informed consent, continuous deep sedation, traditional moral theories underlying bioethical thinking, the definition of mental disease, and codes of ethics for particular medical specialties.

ABSTRACT Scholarship in the area of social movements points to the importance of inter-group collaboration and alliance building. In the case of Indigenous-led movements and the issue of solidarity with non-Indigenous movement participants, scholarship at the intersection of Native studies and social movements suggests that such alliances can be built and sustained but that unlearning colonial attitudes and behaviors is central to this process. Through in-depth interviews with non-Native solidarity participants, this article considers how engagement with Indigenous thought and action (...) re-shapes particpants’ conceptions of environment and place. Findings suggest that such involvement calls attention to histories of violence as well as ongoing practices of dispossession causing activists to grapple not only with their personal and family histories but also with their evolving relationship with environmentalism. (shrink)

People in Belgium want to simplify the electoral laws. The responsible department has a project which is presented as being neutral, having no political implications. The authors compare the results of the last elections computed according to several systems, including the new project. Their conclusion is that the new project is politically oriented : it favours the big parties.The authors propose a new system of ballot which is really neutral, and they show it by a simulation on the results of (...) the elections since 1954.Their system is simple and easily treated by computer. (shrink)

Evolving from both Gifford Pinchot and his utilitarian philosophy of wise use, and John Muir and the preservation philosophy of wilderness, Aldo Leopold espoused--and practices--integrating a degree of wildness into the working agricultural landscape. As newly published essays show, his articulation of "land health" prefigures current definitions of ecosystem health, and the practices he preached anticipate today's prescriptions for ecosystem management. Although the science of ecology has evolved and terminology has changed, Leopold's formulation may help both standardize and institutionalize the (...) concept of ecosystem health, and his example may inspire an ambitious new goal in public and private land management. (shrink)

This article discusses Descartes’s preferred focus on morally and theologically neutral subjects and points out the impact of this focus on the scientific status of theology. It does so by linking Descartes’s method to his transformation of the notion of substance. Descartes’s _Meditations_ centred around epistemological questions rather than non-human intelligences or the life of the mind beyond this world. Likewise, in his early works, Descartes consistently avoided referring to causal operators. Finally, having first redefined the notion of substance in (...) the _Principia,_ Descartes would completely abandon making use of this notion in his later years. Indeed, in contrast to many authors before and after him, Descartes never showed any interest in the long-established metaphysical interpretation of substances as being causal factors of natural change. With God, nature, and mind commonly serving as instances of substantial causality, Descartes’s philosophy had a huge impact on the place of God in science and discreetl. (shrink)

Cheating and deception are terms often used but rarely defined. They summon up unpleasant connotations; even those deeply involved with cheating and deception rationalize why they have been driven to it. Particularly for Americans and much of Western civilization, official cheating, government duplicity, cheating as policy, and conscious, contrived deception, are all unacceptable except as a last resort in response to threat of extinction. As a distasteful tool, deception is rarely used to achieve national interests, unless in relation to the (...) deployment of military force. As an area of study, it has by and large been ignored.Intrigued by attitudes toward cheating and deception, the authors decided to analyze its roots, structure, and process. They asked fundamental questions: are there categories of deception, general steps in the process of deception, and ways to evaluate its results across time and in different modes? The book that results is a typology of kinds of deception, beginning with military deception, but extending into other categories and stages.In his introduction to this new edition, Bell outlines how the book came to be written, describes the mixed emotions toward the subject displayed by govenmental and nongovernmental funding sources, and speculates about its critical and commercial reception. He discusses widespread new interest in the subject, the research that has been undertaken since this book was first published, and its limitations.This book provides a general overview of this complex subject, creating a framework for analysis of specific instances of cheating or deception. It will be of particular interest to political scientists, those interested in military affairs and strategy, and psychologists. The general reader will find the book written with a light touch, drawing examples of cheating and deception in the pursuit of love and money. The specialist reader will be intrigued by its broad-ranging examples drawn from policy and politics, wars and rumors of wars. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ABSTRACT On 19 July 2019, Agnes Heller died whilst swimming in Lake Balaton outside Budapest. With her passing, the culture of humanity lost one of its most remarkable representatives. So too, contemporary critique lost a philosophical sensibility that is, today, within the neoliberal university, increasingly rare. It is this philosophical sensibility with which this essay is concerned. Through a critical reconstruction of Heller’s reading of three key figures from the philosophical tradition (Marx, Pascal and Kierkegaard), this essay both charts the (...) changes and continuities in Heller’s philosophy of concrete subjectivity and makes a case for its continuing relevance to the cultural project of philosophy. (shrink)

First published in 1952, British Empirical Philosophers is a comprehensive picture of one of the most important movements in the history of philosophic thought. In his introduction, Professor A. J. Ayer distinguishes the main problems of empiricism and gives a critical account of the ways in which the philosophers whose writings are included in this volume attempted to solve them. Editors Ayer and Raymond Winch bring together an authoritative abridgement of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bishop George Berkeley’s (...) Principles of Human Knowledge ; almost the entire first book of David Hume’s Treatise Concerning Human Nature ; and extracts from Thomas Reid’s Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man and John Stuart Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. (shrink)

FRANTZEN: KRIT. B. Z. FISCHARTS ÜBERS. RABELAIS' AST 3.